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BOOK REVIEWS

PLUS ÇA CHANGE, PLUS C’EST LA MÊME CHOSE
TORCH: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory, by Vincent P. O’Hara. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2015. 384 pages. $49.95.

In the literary mountain of scholarship,
research, and writing devoted to World
War II, the story of Operation TORCH,
the Allied landings in North Africa in
November of 1942, is presented often as
something of an overture to the massive
amphibious symphonies that followed.
Accounts may include some discussion
of Eisenhower’s growing facility for
strategic leadership, the byzantine nature
of Vichy and Free French politics, and
the gradual emergence of Charles de
Gaulle as the leader of Free France. The
landings themselves all too often have
been presented as hinting of a Kabuki
production, if not of opéra bouffe, with
a few desultory shots fired to assuage
Gallic honor, followed by capitulation.
Then, it seems, the real war begins,
moving down dusty roads to Kasserine,
the initial blooding of the U.S. Army,
the rise of Patton and Bradley, and the
inexorable sweep of operations to Sicily,
the Italian mainland, and eventually the
beaches and hedgerows of Normandy.
Vincent O’Hara has done much to
correct this impression and to give
TORCH the attention it deserves.
Readers will come away with a much
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better understanding of the difficulties
faced by both the French defenders and
the Allied invaders and the political
currents that swirled about the operation
from the very beginning—and with
an appreciation for how the results
could have been very different.
As O’Hara points out, 1942 was a
parlous time for the Allies. Axis
armies were cutting deep into the
Soviet Union, and fear that it would
drop out of the war was palpable. U.S.
leaders, particularly George Marshall,
eschewed what might be considered
military sideshows and argued for a
rapid buildup of force in Great Britain,
followed by a cross-channel invasion
at the earliest opportunity. The British,
led by Churchill and scarred by their
experience in World War I, preferred
less direct approaches, avoiding the U.S.favored direct attack until victory was
assured. TORCH represented a victory
for British planners and a setback for
Marshall. This is among the betterknown elements of the North African
campaign, and O’Hara does it justice
without dwelling overlong on the topic.
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In contrast, French politics usually
are, for the most part, underexamined,
and O’Hara provides a valuable
understanding of French actors and
motives. His examination of Marshal
Pétain’s efforts to end the German
occupation and restore France to
something approaching its former status
is both convincing and useful. So too
is O’Hara’s meticulous description of
French forces, plans, and readiness in
North Africa on the eve of invasion.
O’Hara’s discussion of invasion
planning and preparation and the
movement to the various landing
beaches is excellent. Although dwarfed
by later invasions, TORCH required
a major effort at a time when Allied
amphibious resources were extremely
limited. Scheduling convoys, arranging
for carrier-based air support, and
coping with potentially lethal surf
conditions all foreshadowed difficulties
that would have to be overcome in later
amphibious operations. The plan was
audacious. Allied forces were to carry
out five simultaneous and geographically separated landings on the Atlantic
and Mediterranean shores of North
Africa, then race to Tunis to trap
German forces in Africa and deny those
forces additional support from Europe.
Accomplishing this would bring the
Mediterranean under much greater Allied control, and the Axis might have to
take some pressure off the Soviet Union
to deal with the new threat to the south.
As O’Hara makes clear, French
resistance, while affected by conflicting orders on whether to take Allied
troops under fire, was not a token
effort, although the loss of only 1,700
Allied wounded and killed may have
contributed to this impression. Although
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ill equipped and often outnumbered,
French forces, including colonial auxiliaries and units of the Foreign Legion,
fought well. While some French units
offered no resistance, they did so in obedience to orders from their commanders. O’Hara details the action on each
of the five invasion beaches in detail.
The naval battle of Casablanca was, as
O’Hara describes it, “the largest surface,
air, and subsurface naval action fought
in the Atlantic Ocean during World War
II.” The battle, which lasted six hours,
featured naval gunfire duels between
USS Massachusetts and the disabled
French battleship Jean Bart. French
shore batteries engaged U.S. warships
and French combatants shelled Allied
landing craft en route to the invasion
beaches. French officers handled their
ships with courage and daring, and they
came close to engaging the Allied troop
transports. Maps are provided, greatly
aiding the reader’s understanding of
how the battle was conducted. There
was also a naval engagement off Oran,
and Italian and German aircraft and
submarines conducted significant
antishipping actions as the campaign
wore on. O’Hara illustrates that, far
from being an Allied walkover, the
possibility of TORCH resulting in a
disaster at sea was much more likely
than is normally acknowledged.
A greater appreciation of TORCH by
students of amphibious warfare is warranted. Many of the problems associated
with projecting power from the sea were
identified during this campaign. The
role of beachmasters, the timing and
coordination of shore bombardment,
and the logistical difficulties associated with landing supplies on an open
beach in high surf all were factors. At
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times the lessons learned were small,
such as the discovery that landing net
rungs spaced too far apart posed a
significant danger to debarking troops.
Some elements of the TORCH landings
touch on current questions. For example,
although the Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe
raids had demonstrated previously the
inherent difficulty in conducting an
amphibious assault on built-up areas,
TORCH would feature several efforts
along these lines. The most dramatic of
these was an attempt to land U.S. troops
from HMS Walney and HMS Hartland
(the former U.S. Coast Guard cutters
Sebago and Pontchartrain, respectively)
directly onto the moles of Oran Harbor.
Both vessels quickly were identified as
hostile and ran an intense gauntlet of
French fire until sunk. In contrast, an
attempt was made to sail USS Dallas, a
vintage destroyer carrying seventy-five
specially trained assault troops, six miles
up Port Lyautey’s Wadi Sebou waterway
to carry out an attack on a critically important all-weather airfield. The effort,
despite experiencing significant delays,
succeeded. In an ever-urbanizing world,
the viability of direct amphibious assaults may be open to debate once again.
O’Hara rightfully points out that TORCH,
in the main, failed to deliver hoped-for
results. It would take five months to
achieve victory in North Africa, not the
three weeks anticipated. The operation
did nothing to ease the plight of the
Soviet Union and the Mediterranean
remained contested waters. The African
campaign drew men, matériel, and
shipping away from efforts to support
a direct invasion of Europe. TORCH
resulted in the total occupation of
France by Germany and the intentional
scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon.
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None of these results, according to
O’Hara, inflicted real loss on Italy and
Germany. However, in the opportunity
to identify and resolve amphibious
challenges and as a beginning to the
development of a truly combined
strategic command, TORCH was of
value. If, as O’Hara claims, TORCH also
ensured that France would not become
a true ally of Germany, the strategic
benefit may have been significant.
TORCH sheds some welcome light on
a campaign that too often is passed
over. Scholars and lay readers alike will
find the book useful. While O’Hara
has performed yeoman service in
providing this detailed account of the
amphibious portion of the campaign,
perhaps his greatest contribution
is to restore the reputation of naval
forces that, far from offering token
resistance, fought with courage and
tenacity, often against superior odds.
RICHARD J. NORTON

How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II, by Phillips Payson
O’Brien. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2015. 640 pages. $35.

This book provides a detailed reexamination of the main contributory factors
leading to Allied victory in World War
II. In many ways the book’s argument
is not so much new as it is a revision
of the revisionists. During the Cold
War the narrative was largely that the
Western Allies had triumphed over
Germany and Japan with some help
from the Soviet Union. That narrative
was challenged at the time, and with
more success after the end of the Cold
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